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OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES AND R&D INVESTMENTS OF 
U.S. AND JAPANESE FIRMS: AGENCY AND 
STEWARDSHIP PERSPECTIVES 
PEGGY M. LEE 
Emory University 
HUGH M. O'NEILL 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
This study analyzes the impact of ownership structure on R&D investments in the 
United States and Japan. It begins with the premise that U.S. and Japanese firms have 
distinct patterns of ownership that may result in disparities in R&D investments. 
Agency theory and stewardship theory are used to hypothesize about the relationship 
between ownership and R&D investments. Empirical evidence shows that the level of 
ownership concentration, and its impact, differ across countries. We argue that these 
differences result from a mixture of motives and incentives. 
With communism laid to rest . .. it has become fash- 
ionable to talk of numerous capitalist "models"-- 
the American model.., .in which firms feed on a 
huge and liquid stock market; the Japanese one, in 
which groups of firms and banks are bound together 
through complex webs of crossholdings. 
The Economist, October 8, 1994: 82 
Agency theorists have long argued that differ- 
ences in ownership structure are crucial to under- 
standing the resolution and the outcomes of prin- 
cipal-agent problems in modern corporations (e.g., 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Recent research has 
demonstrated that agency assumptions, which ad- 
dress possible disparity between the interests of the 
owners and managers of corporations, only fit par- 
ticular contexts and may be contingent on compet- 
itive factors (Boyd, 1994, 1995). For example, Lane, 
Cannella, and Lubatkin (1998) suggested that the 
predictions of agency theory are unsupported in 
instances when managerial interests do not clearly 
conflict with those of stakeholders. Similarly, we 
argue that the differences between the ownership 
structures of relationship-oriented Japanese firms 
and market-based U.S. firms (Kaplan, 1997; Porter, 
1992; Prowse, 1994) may also limit the generaliz- 
ability of agency theory. In the United States, the 
separation of ownership from control and the 
presence of atomistic shareholders have induced 
conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders (Berle & Means, 1932). In contrast, 
the ownership structure of a Japanese firm is often 
a manifestation of existing cooperative links with 
suppliers, members of the keiretsu (business group) 
with which the firm is affiliated, or debt holders; 
consequently, the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders tends to diminish with 
the ties that bind managers and shareholders (Aoki, 
Patrick, & Sheard, 1994; Kester, 1991). 
Stewardship theory offers an alternative perspec- 
tive (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Fox & 
Hamilton, 1994); its key argument is that the inter- 
ests of managers may be aligned with those of own- 
ers. If this is true, then governance devices adopted 
on the basis of agency-theoretic prescriptions may 
be redundant (at best) and inefficient (Barney & 
Hansen, 1994). In other words, what works well to 
control or motivate an opportunistic manager may 
not work well to control or motivate a steward. In 
some instances, agency-based prescriptions ap- 
plied to stewards may have no material impact on 
performance outcomes. In other instances, though, 
misapplied agency-theory-derived prescriptions, 
such as increased levels of managerial ownership, 
might lead to a misallocation of resources in a firm. 
That is, increased levels of management ownership 
may decrease the levels of R&D (Jensen, 1989a) 
and, in turn, decrease the long-run value of a 
firm (David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001). Furthermore, 
it is possible that classic agency assumptions 
are specific to Anglo-American contexts (Phan & 
Yoshikawa, 2000). 
This study examined the relationship between 
the ownership structures and R&D investments of 
U.S. and Japanese firms. In doing so, we extended 
and tested the applicability of both agency and 
stewardship theory in this particular context. From 
We are grateful to Grace Pownall, Sunil Wahal, the 
editors, and the reviewers for their useful comments. 
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an agency theory perspective, the extent of a firm's 
investment in R&D is a decision that is subject to 
potential manager-shareholder conflicts (Baysinger, 
Kosnik, & Turk, 1991). Indeed, empirical studies of 
U.S. firms have found that stock concentration and 
institutional ownership are linked to R&D invest- 
ments (Graves, 1988; Hansen & Hill, 1991). Further- 
more, R&D investments have become increasingly 
important in a knowledge-based economy (Ba- 
daracco, 1991). Nonetheless, empirical evidence on 
the effects of ownership structure in cross-national 
settings is sparse. The following sections review 
the importance of and the characteristics of R&D 
investments and develop hypotheses based on agen- 
cy-theoretic and stewardship-theoretic arguments. 
THEORETICAL REVIEW 
Ownership "represents a source of power that 
can be used to either support or oppose manage- 
ment depending on how it is concentrated and 
used" (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980: 655). Conse- 
quently, it has important strategic implications for 
takeover resistance, R&D investments, and the 
long- or short-term orientation of managers (Hill & 
Snell, 1989; Williamson, 1964). The influence of 
ownership structure is often studied in the context 
of agency theory. 
Agency theory has its foundations in the seminal 
work of Berle and Means (1932). Berle and Means 
(1932) introduced the concept of the separation of 
owners and managers as a central aspect of the 
American corporate governance system. This sepa- 
ration has been touted as efficient by financial 
economists and business historians who view man- 
agers as the principal drivers of American industry 
(Chandler, 1962). In particular, this separation al- 
lows shareholders to efficiently diversify their port- 
folios, thereby specializing in risk bearing, and al- 
lows managers, who may lack resources for 
ownership, to specialize in managing. 
Although the separation of ownership from con- 
trol has many benefits, it also has a number of costs 
associated with it. Prominent among these costs are 
agency problems, which are frequently manifested 
in opportunistic behavior by managers and exces- 
sive consumption of perks (Jensen, 1989a, 1989b). 
Agency problems exist because principals (share- 
holders) and agents (managers) have differing risk 
preferences, are boundedly rational, and have con- 
flicting interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Holstrom, 
1979). Furthermore, as ownership disperses, the 
incentive to exercise ownership rights disperses, a 
pattern resulting in "strong managers and weak 
owners" (Roe, 1994; Walsh & Seward, 1990). Thus, 
U.S. managers are typically monitored through 
mechanisms such as the market for corporate con- 
trol, active investors, and boards of directors; small 
atomistic shareholders play a minimal role in mon- 
itoring managers. 
In Japan, ownership is concentrated, relation- 
ship-based, and relatively illiquid (Aoki et al., 
1995; Kaplan, 1997). Japanese managers are moni- 
tored by banks, large shareholders, and intercorpo- 
rate relationships. For example, Japanese "main 
banks" play a central role in initiating top manage- 
ment turnover and appointments (Kang & Shiv- 
dasani, 1995; Kaplan, 1994; Kaplan & Minton, 
1994) and influence the investment process, even 
for companies that are not in distress (Hoshi, 
Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 1991). These banks tend to 
be well-informed about firms' prospects (Aoki et 
al., 1995; Kester, 1991). Perhaps the sharpest dis- 
tinction between U.S. and Japanese ownership 
structures is that shareholders of Japanese firms 
tend to be well-informed and active in important 
firm decisions. This particular difference is likely 
to influence managerial behavior, particularly in- 
vestment decisions. 
Stewardship Theory: The United States 
versus Japan 
The ownership differences described above may 
diminish the explanatory power of agency theory 
in a Japanese context. Davis, Schoorman, and 
Donaldson's (1997) stewardship theory offers an 
alternative perspective. In their words, "steward- 
ship theory defines situations in which managers 
are not motivated by individual goals, but rather 
are stewards whose motives are aligned with the 
objectives of their principals" (1997: 21). Unlike 
agency theory, stewardship theory rests on the as- 
sumption that the goals of managers and sharehold- 
ers are aligned. To date, the theory has been subject 
to a limited number of direct and indirect tests (Fox 
& Hamilton, 1994). Lane, Cannella, and Lubatkin 
commented that "stewardship theory may prove to 
be an insightful perspective for corporate gover- 
nance research" (1998: 574). 
As Weick (1979) noted, no theory is accurate in 
all contexts. A corollary principle might be that any 
good theory can be accurate in some contexts. 
Thus, an important question is, What governance 
contexts and relationships are better explained by 
stewardship theory than by agency theory? In de- 
riving their theory, Davis and his coauthors (1997) 
provided psychological and situational clues about 
"steward-rich" empirical contexts. In describing 
the psychological underpinnings of stewardship 
theory, they asserted that a steward will engage in 
pro-organizational, collectivist behaviors, gaining 
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more satisfaction from serving the group than from 
serving him- or herself. Further, these behaviors 
will be preferred to alternative, self-interested be- 
haviors. This form of group-directed behavior can 
occur under two conditions. 
The first condition occurs when an actor's moti- 
vational scheme is based on intrinsic and intangi- 
ble rewards. This may occur, for example, among 
individuals who are self-actualizing (Maslow, 
1970) or who are self-leaders (Manz, 1990). The 
second condition occurs when individuals have 
high levels of organizational identification (Mael & 
Ashforth, 1992). The effects of organizational com- 
mitment or value commitment (Mayer & Schoor- 
man, 1992) are similar: managers who identify with 
an organization and accept its values will not ex- 
perience goal conflict with that organization. 
In describing the situational underpinnings of 
stewardship theory, Davis and his coauthors (1997) 
noted that national culture is an important deter- 
minant of steward behavior. They focused on two 
measures of national culture, drawn from Hof- 
stede's (1980, 1991) work: individualism/collectiv- 
ism and power distance. In collectivist cultures, in 
which group interests are valued above those of 
individuals, managers act on the basis of long-term 
relationships and have high levels of trust. In high- 
power-distance cultures, in which individuals cede 
power to the incumbents of superior positions, 
managers accept the roles implied by hierarchy and 
are less likely to act in ways that induce conflict 
with principals. Japan, in contrast to the United 
States, is a high-power-distance, collectivist cul- 
ture (Hofstede, 1980, 1991). As Davis and his col- 
leagues noted, "We might expect that members of a 
collectivist culture would.., .establish an organi- 
zational structure that is conducive to the develop- 
ment of stewardship relationships" (1997: 36). 
Studies have revealed differences between the 
U.S. and Japanese cultures (Davis et al., 1997; Hof- 
stede, 1980, 1991). Specifically, Japan has propor- 
tionately more instances of lifetime employment, 
lower levels of individualism, and higher levels of 
power distance than the United States (Davis et al., 
1997; Hofstede, 1980, 1991). These factors point to 
a higher incidence of steward forms of relationship 
in Japan. 
The net impact on behavior is a function of the 
incidence of goal conflict and the power of the 
market for corporate control as well as the influ- 
ence of owners, particularly blockholders (owners 
of 5 percent or more of a firm's equity). Researchers 
in both finance and strategy have pointed to the 
importance of blockholders in influencing impor- 
tant firm-level decisions such as mergers and re- 
structuring (Demsetz, 1983; Lane et al., 1998; Shle- 
ifer & Vishny, 1986; Walsh & Seward, 1990). In our 
study, we add to this stream of research by com- 
paring the influence of blockholders in two unique 
situational environments that might be respectively 
characterized as an agency environment (the 
United States) and a stewardship environment 
(Japan). 
The Link between Ownership Structure and 
R&D Investments 
R&D expenditures are specific types of invest- 
ments, in that their outcomes are neither immedi- 
ate nor certain. Indeed, R&D expenditures may not 
result in any payoff (they may be entirely unpro- 
ductive) or may translate into profits only after 
many years. As Lippman and Rumelt stated, 
knowledge creation involves "irreducible ex ante 
uncertainty" (1982: 418). This uncertainty may 
make it difficult for investors to know the value of 
R&D expenditures. Nonetheless, investment in 
R&D is crucial for both the survival and growth of 
firms, particularly in sectors such as pharmaceuti- 
cals and technology. Therefore, decisions regarding 
the magnitude and allocation of R&D expenditures 
are extremely important for corporations. Such de- 
cisions are at the discretion of management. 
Several researchers have argued that the expec- 
tations of investors, their concern with stock prices, 
and their holding periods can affect R&D invest- 
ments. Shorter horizons for stockholders can lead 
to shorter horizons for managers, perhaps causing 
managers to forgo R&D investments (Froot, Perold, 
& Stein, 1992). More formally, Stein (1988, 1989) 
developed a model that links investor behavior to 
R&D investments. He identified two primary deter- 
minants of reduced R&D investments: takeover 
pressures and the behavior or beliefs of investors. 
The short-term behavior of shareholders can pres- 
sure managers to overemphasize current bottom- 
line earnings. For example, profit-conscious inves- 
tors may become distressed by low earnings reports 
(inversely related to the level of R&D investments) 
and try to sell their stocks. If many investors sell 
their stocks at the announcement of low quarterly 
earnings, the value of a firm declines. In this way, 
the behavior of investors is directly related to the 
short-term pressures that managers face and may 
influence their long-term investment decisions. 
An underlying assumption of Stein's model is 
that information asymmetry exists between inves- 
tors and managers. Information asymmetry arises 
from the inability of managers to convey informa- 
tion about their firm and from the reluctance of 
investors to gather information about firm activi- 
ties. The more information a shareholder has (that 
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is, information asymmetry is reduced), the easier it 
is for that investor to value R&D investments. Thus, 
the larger the presence of "information-intensive" 
shareholders, the lower the likelihood that manag- 
ers will be subject to short-term pressures. 
The nature of information on R&D investments 
exacerbates the information gap (Myers, 1984). An- 
nouncing R&D projects may provide an important 
signal to competitors (Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983); 
conveying details of R&D programs may put firms 
at a competitive disadvantage. Thus, managers may 
release few or no details about R&D initiatives and 
may even forbear to announce them. This "lack of 
communication prevents investors from under- 
standing management's -long-term goals and objec- 
tives. Because most U.S. investors are detached 
from the business they fund, they rely on outward 
manifestations of what is really going within a com- 
pany, namely quarterly earnings" (Jacobs, 1991: 10). 
Communication between investors and managers 
can reduce managerial pressures to produce short- 
term profits. For example, if investors were aware 
that a drop in quarterly earnings was the conse- 
quence of productive investments in R&D, then 
these investors might not be so quick to sell their 
shares. Consistent with that idea is Bebchuk and 
Stole's (1993) finding that when investors lacked 
information about long-run projects, underinvest- 
ment was induced; on the other hand, when in- 
vestors were aware of an investment, but not its 
productivity (in the case of R&D investment), over- 
investment occurred. Thus, it is important to 
distinguish investors with access to information 
from those who lack such access. 
Large shareholders have incentives to obtain 
more detailed information and reduce information 
asymmetry. Large shareholders (or blockholders) 
have more at stake and, hence, a greater incentive 
to gather information about firm investments. Fur- 
thermore, concentrated ownership creates liquidity 
problems for shareholders: large shareholders can- 
not sell large holdings in a company without sig- 
nificantly lowering the price of its stock. This cre- 
ates a mutual dependence. Investors depend on 
managers to create value and profits, while manag- 
ers depend on investors' evaluations of a firm. This 
mutual dependence creates a long-term relation- 
ship between investors and managers and increases 
investors' incentives to reduce information asym- 
metry. Not surprisingly, studies have shown a pos- 
itive relationship between the level of stock con- 
centration and R&D investments for U.S. firms (e.g., 
Hansen & Hill, 1991; Hill & Snell, 1988). In con- 
trast, in an environment where managers' and own- 
ers' interests are already aligned (that is, where 
owners are stewards), the influence of blockholders 
should be inconsequential for R&D investment. 
Thus, 
Hypothesis la. Stock concentration is posi- 
tively related to investments in R&D in the 
United States. 
Hypothesis lb. Stock concentration is unre- 
lated to investments in R&D in Japan. 
The type of relationship that exists between in- 
vestors and managers can also affect information 
asymmetry. In the United States, managers may 
want to divorce ownership from control of firm 
activities completely, so that access to capital 
comes with few or no obligations to shareholders. 
Shareholders tend to hold diverse portfolios, so 
keeping up with specific business activities is often 
difficult (Jacobs, 1991). Therefore, the atomistic 
ownership structure of U.S. firms exacerbates the 
information asymmetry between investors and 
managers. Given little information, investors may 
interpret reduced current earnings resulting from 
an increase in R&D expenditures negatively be- 
cause they cannot distinguish between profitable 
and nonprofitable R&D investments. Hence, the 
ownership structure of U.S. firms appears to exac- 
erbate the information asymmetry between inves- 
tors and managers and contributes to the short-term 
pressures that managers face. 
In contrast, Japanese firms have relied on a main 
bank system for equity and debt. The main bank 
system refers to "a system of corporate financing 
and governance involving an informal set of prac- 
tices, institutional arrangements, and behaviors 
among industrial and commercial firms, banks of 
various types, other financial institutions, and the 
regulatory authorities" (Aoki et al., 1995: 3). In this 
system, the main bank plays an important role in 
monitoring firms and intervening in their manage- 
ment, as necessary (Sheard, 1994). 
Another striking feature of Japanese firms is the 
prevalence of interlocking shareholdings. A typical 
listed firm in Japan has extensive shareholdings 
with transaction partners, including banks, insur- 
ance companies, suppliers, and affiliated firms 
(Sheard, 1994). These owners supply capital, mon- 
itor management, and have more information avail- 
able to them than do the shareholders of U.S. firms. 
They enhance an already large base of patient cap- 
ital (that is, investment by investors with a long- 
term perspective), thereby allowing managers to 
take a long-term view of investments by insulating 
them from hostile takeovers and short-term stock 
price volatility (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985). 
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Hypothesis 2a. On the average, Japanese firms 
have a more concentrated ownership structure 
than their U.S. counterparts. 
Three important features arise from concentrated 
ownership by banks, affiliated firms, and cross- 
shareholding. First, the relationship between banks 
and their clients consists of an ownership of both 
debt and equity, resulting in economies of informa- 
tion gathering and sharing. Second, this relation- 
ship is ongoing (James, 1987). Third, concentrated 
ownership reduces information gaps. In general, 
these features combine to create a more concen- 
trated ownership structure and to reduce informa- 
tion asymmetry. As a result, there is less pressure 
on managers to reduce R&D. 
Hypothesis 2b. On the average, Japanese firms 
invest more in R&D than their U.S. counterparts. 
Hypotheses la and lb represent incentive align- 
ment arguments, suggesting that the relationship 
between owner concentration and R&D invest- 
ments is driven by the influence of concentration 
on goal alignment. Thus, these hypotheses state 
that concentration will increase R&D investments 
in the U.S. environment, an agency context, and 
will not increase R&D intensity in Japan, a steward- 
ship context. Hypotheses 2a and 2b, building on an 
information alignment perspective, suggest that 
R&D investments will be higher in Japan. In fact, 
concentration can have a positive impact on both 
incentive and information alignment. Our hypoth- 
eses build on the assumptions that both issues are 
important in the United States but that only infor- 
mation would be relevant in Japan. 
In addition to the primary considerations dis- 
cussed above, a number of other factors may influ- 
ence R&D investments. Firm size may be positively 
related to R&D investments because of economies 
of scale and scope. Debt can be negatively related to 
R&D investments if it prevents firms from raising 
necessary funds (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993; Myers, 
1977) or curtails overinvestment owing to agency 
problems between managers and shareholders 
(Jensen, 1989a). Larger investment opportunities 
are likely to induce managers to invest more in 
R&D. Finally, how well firms are able to internalize 
the benefits of R&D efforts and produce new prod- 
ucts (Doukas & Switzer, 1992) can influence R&D 
investment. This ability is referred to as appropri- 
ability. Levin (1988) and Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, 
and Winter (1987) found that appropriability con- 
ditions vary primarily by industry. In addition, in- 
dustry demands and competition may influence 
the level of R&D investments (Ito & Pucik, 1993). 
For example, one might expect that firms in highly 
competitive industries, such as the semiconductor 
industry, will need to invest in R&D in order to stay 
abreast of technological change. All of the above 
factors served as controls in our empirical methods. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
The sample consisted of all U.S. and Japanese 
firms publicly traded in 1995 in seven different 
industries: automotive, chemicals, communication, 
computers, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and power. 
Examining multiple industries enhances the va- 
lidity and generalizability of results. For the U.S. 
sample, we identified industries using two-digit 
primary SIC codes. Industries for the Japanese 
firms were categorized according to the Japan 
Company Handbook (JCH). The U.S. sample in- 
cluded 1,044 firms representing all seven indus- 
tries; the Japanese sample consisted of 270 firms in 
six of the industries, because firms that compete in 
the Japanese computer industry are usually placed 
in the electronics industry. 
Differences in Accounting Systems 
Since many of the variables used in the empirical 
tests reported below rely on financial statement 
data, it is important to describe national differences 
in accounting systems. Choi and Mueller (1984) 
identified two broad classifications of accounting 
systems: those that developed from the Anglo- 
British tradition (like the U.S. system), and those 
that developed from the Franco-European tradition 
(like the Japanese system). The former emphasizes 
a firm's need to report the numbers to its owners, 
and the latter is based on the reporting of uniform 
and comparable numbers within a country. 
One primary difference between U.S. and Japa- 
nese accounting standards is the way R&D invest- 
ments are reported. In the United States, firms are 
required to expense investments in R&D in each 
period. Japanese firms, in contrast, are allowed to 
capitalize R&D expenditures; once they have been 
capitalized, the Japanese government and its sanc- 
tioned financial agencies require costs to be amor- 
tized over a period not exceeding five years, with at 
least one-fifth in each accounting period (KPMG, 
1989: 5). In other words, Japanese firms may report 
only a fifth of their total expenditures, which 
would allow them to show higher profits in their 
financial statements. Dellmann (1983: 948), how- 
ever, reported that Japanese companies prefer to 
write off such expenditures as incurred. Moreover, 
the Japanese firms in this sample are subject to 
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standards set by the Ministry of Finance, by secu- 
rities and exchange law, and by the Business Ac- 
counting Deliberating Council, thereby ensuring 
the consistent reporting necessary for within-coun- 
try comparisons. 
In an attempt to produce empirical comparisons, 
accounting researchers (e.g., Bhagat & Welch, 1995) 
have recognized differences and limitations of 
cross-country comparisons and provided guide- 
lines for comparability. There were several rea- 
sons to assume that the difference in Japanese and 
U.S. accounting standards would not bias results. 
The first is Bhagat and Welch's argument that "one 
can tolerate differences in accounting procedures 
... basic accounting principles and intents are sim- 
ilar in all OECD countries. Consequently, differ- 
ences produced by accounting variations among 
the basic set of variations and countries considered 
are unlikely to be first order effects" (1995: 450). 
Second, the Japan Company Handbook presents 
the most reliable R&D numbers (see Hall & Wein- 
stein, 1996) and reports the actual figures that have 
been expensed in each previous term (Toyo Keizai, 
1996: 62). Third, we used accounting data from the 
Global Vantage databases for robustness checks. 
The Global Vantage database is collected according 
to standardized definitions researched and written 
jointly by Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT Ser- 
vices and Extel Financial Ltd. To ensure consis- 
tency across different industries and different 
countries, we only report data when the same re- 
porting convention was applied across firms. In 
other words, if a Japanese firm's R&D expenditures 
were not comparable to U.S. firms', we do not re- 
port them. The R&D numbers from the two data- 
bases are comparable, with a correlation of .98. 
Fourth, to the extent that Japanese firms underre- 
port R&D investments, this reporting bias works 
against the results documented in this study. Fi- 
nally, we conducted separate regression analyses 
for each country to test the hypotheses; we esti- 
mated a pooled sample to test the potential differ- 
ence between the two samples by examining the 
country dummy variable, not to interpret other 
pooled coefficients. 
Measures and Data Sources 
Variables. We used the ratio of R&D invest- 
ment-to sales in 1995 to measure R&D invest- 
ments. For the U.S. sample, these data come from 
COMPUSTAT. For the Japanese sample, these data 
come from the JCH. 
Stock concentration was measured as the total 
percentage of stock held by shareholders (e.g., Hill 
& Snell, 1988, 1989) that owned at least 3 percent of 
a firm's stock for both U.S. and Japanese firms. We 
used 3 percent to capture the influence of large 
owners, including pension funds, which customar- 
ily hold less than 5 percent of a single firm's stock. 
U.S. ownership data came from Compact Disclo- 
sure. Japanese ownership data come from the JCH, 
which provides information on the identity and 
ownership position of each "major" shareholder. 
Major shareholders are defined by the handbook as 
those "who wield a strong influence in company 
decisions" (Toyo Keizai, 1996: 58). A dummy vari- 
able for country was coded 1 for Japanese firms and 
0 for U.S. firms. 
Control variables. We also used a number of 
control variables to account for alternative determi- 
nants of R&D. These included firm size, industry 
dummies, leverage, and investment opportunity. 
For the United States, accounting data came from 
COMPUSTAT. For Japan, data came from the JCH. 
Firm size was measured as the book value of 
assets. Since total assets are highly skewed when a 
cross-section is taken, we used a logarithmic trans- 
formation. Leverage was measured as the book 
value of debt divided by total assets. Following Cho 
(1998), we measured investment opportunities us- 
ing the market-to-book ratio, calculating it as the 
market value of equity at the end of a year plus the 
book value of debt divided by the book value of 
total assets. We used two-digit SIC codes to code 
the industries of U.S. firms and the JCH to classify 
the Japanese firms into industries. 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we regressed the 
R&D-to-sales ratio on firm size, leverage, the mar- 
ket-to-book ratio, the industry dummies, and stock 
concentration for each country subsample and for a 
pooled sample. Although we suggest a positive 
causal relationship between stock concentration 
and R&D investments, an equally persuasive argu- 
ment can be made for reverse causality. For exam- 
ple, one may argue that particular types of investors 
may be attracted to firms with high R&D invest- 
ments (rather than encouraging R&D investinents). 
This endogeneity between ownership concentra- 
tion and the R&D-to-sales ratio may result in incon- 
sistent ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates (Cho, 
1998). We used a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation procedure to resolve this causality is- 
sue. Specifically, the procedure requires estimation 
of first-stage and second-stage regressions. In the 
first-stage regression, values predicted (via OLS) for 
the endogenous regressor using all exogenous vari- 
ables are estimated. In the second-stage regression, 
these predicted values are used instead of the en- 
dogenous regressor (Greene, 1997). Here, firm size 
(the logarithm of total assets), the lagged value of 
leverage, the industry dummies, and the market-to- 
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book ratio were used as exogenous variables. We 
used the lagged value of leverage to control for the 
possibility that leverage may also be endogenously 
determined (Cho, 1998). Having a country dummy 
in the pooled regression allowed for a test of differ- 
ences between the U.S. and Japanese samples. 
Finally, the pooled regression results might be 
driven by the larger U.S. sample. For a robustness 
check, we also estimated a weighted least squares 
model in which the weight of the U.S. sample was 
the inverse of the number of U.S. firms in the in- 
dustry multiplied by the number of firms for the 
same industry in the Japanese sample. This weight- 
ing scheme placed U.S. and Japanese firms on an 
equal footing in terms of their weight in the regres- 
sion equations. One must be cautious in interpret- 
ing the pooled results, however, because the pur- 
pose of pooling the results was to test potential 
differences between the two samples by examining 
the country dummy variable, not to interpret other 
pooled coefficients. In the interest of brevity, we do 
not report results from the weighted least squares 
regression; the results are similar to those for the 
2SLS regressions reported in Table 3. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the means and medians of firm 
R&D expenditures, the R&D sales ratio, and size (as 
measured by assets) by industry for the U.S. and 
Japanese samples. 
Table 1 suggests that there are a sufficient num- 
ber of firms in each industry subsample to allow us 
to pick up industry effects; this is important for the 
regression estimates since industry effects are sig- 
nificant determinants of R&D investments. It is 
worth noting that the firms in the U.S. and Japanese 
samples represented all of the publicly traded firms 
in these industries; sampling variation due to data 
constraints was small. 
R&D investments are reported in millions of U.S. 
dollars, and yen are converted at end-of-1995 ex- 
TABLE 1 
Characteristics of U.S. and Japanese Firms by Industry 
United States Japan 
Industry Mean Median (n) Mean Median (n) 
R&D investments 
Automotive 150.66 1.56 (150) 175.95 44.49 (36) 
Chemical 55.29 3.28 (156) 53.59 21.55 (87) 
Communication 31.36 0.00 (200) 270.92 59.29 (12) 
Computer 88.59 4.51 (166) 
Electronic 41.14 2.58 (494) 210.09 28.09 (115) 
Pharmaceutical 154.59 4.56 (129) 109.38 59.86 (32) 
Power 15.88 0.00 (289) 612.01 89.67 (12) 
Total 61.27 0.73 (1,584) 167.53 34.12 (294) 
R&D/sales 
Automotive 0.02 0.01 (150) 0.04 0.04 (36) 
Chemical 0.04 0.03 (156) 0.05 0.05 (87) 
Communication 0.01 0.00 (200) 0.10 0.04 (12) 
Computer 0.11 0.08 (166) 
Electronic 0.09 0.05 (494) 0.06 0.05 (115) 
Pharmaceutical 0.25 0.10 (129) 0.11 0.11 (32) 
Power 0.00 0.00 (289) 0.04 0.01 (12) 
Total 0.06 0.01 (1,584) 0.06 0.05 (294) 
Assets 
Automotive 4,517.03 209.81 (150) 4,980.65 1,336.67 (36) 
Chemical 2,193.56 292.88 (156) 2,049.60 765.17 (87) 
Communication 3,456.23 386.68 (200) 10,770.57 1,604.61 (12) 
Computer 1,133.58 46.59 (166) 
Electronic 971.70 55.83 (494) 4,333.45 840.62 (115) 
Pharmaceutical 1,787.34 46.54 (129) 1,853.86 1,092.61 (32) 
Power 2,589.28 110.94 (289) 27,995.03 16,636.03 (12) 
Total 2,119.99 91.66 (1,584) 4,695.50 1,006.33 (294) 
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change rates. The table shows that there is substan- 
tial variation across both industry and country. 
Means and medians differ discernibly, implying 
that R&D investments are skewed. This result is not 
surprising, because these numbers do not control 
for firm size. Hence, this table also presents univar- 
iate statistics on the R&D-to-sales ratio for the sam- 
ple of firms. As expected, the R&D-to-sales ratios 
are much less skewed; the mean figures do not 
differ substantially from the median. Second, it 
appears that the R&D-to-sales ratio is the same 
(0.06) for both samples. Thus, at an aggregate level, 
it does not appear that firms in one country spend 
more on R&D than firms in the other country. 
Table 1 also reports total assets for the sample 
firms by industry. On average, the Japanese firms 
were larger than U.S. firms. These size differences 
may be attributable to data collection issues. Spe- 
cifically, data on large Japanese firms are easier to 
obtain. It is unlikely, however, that these size dif- 
ferences significantly affected the results for two 
reasons. First, large firms are also represented in 
the U.S. sample. Second, we explicitly controlled 
for firm size in the regressions. 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients of 
independent and dependent variables. For the U.S. 
sample, stock concentration is negatively (-0.31) 
correlated with firm size (the logarithm of assets). 
Multicollinearity, though, should not be a problem 
because while some of the correlations are statisti- 
cally significant, their magnitudes are not large. 
Regression Results 
Stock concentration and R&D investments. Hy- 
pothesis la states that stock concentration will be 
positively related to investments in R&D in the 
United States; Hypothesis lb asserts that there will 
be no relationship in Japan. Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
state that ownership will be more concentrated and 
R&D investments will be higher in Japan. To test 
these hypotheses, we estimated regression equa- 
tions with the R&D-to-sales ratio as a dependent 
variable for each country sample and the pooled 
sample. The independent variables in these regres- 
sions were assets (the measure of firm size), lever- 
age, the market-to-book ratio, industry dummies, 
and stock concentration. The first four variables 
were control variables; stock concentration was the 
primary variable of interest. The automotive indus- 
try was the referent category in each of the regres- 
sions. Table 3 presents the first- and second-stage 
results of the 2SLS regressions for the U.S., Japa- 
nese, and pooled samples. The sample sizes are 
slightly smaller than those on which the results 
presented in Table 2 were based because data on 
control variables were not available for some firms. 
Table 3 also shows estimates obtained via "bench- 
mark OLS" regression; these analyses were identi- 
cal to the second-stage regression but have the 
stock concentration variable omitted. This omis- 
sion allows statistics (adjusted R2s) to be compared 
for the benchmark OLS regression and the second- 
stage regression to determine the marginal contri- 
bution of stock concentration. 
U.S. sample. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the 
2SLS regression shows a significant, positive rela- 
tionship between stock concentration and the R&D- 
to-sales ratio. The 0.13 (p < .001) coefficient sug- 
gests that a 10 percent increase in ownership is 
related to a 0.01 increase in the R&D-to-sales ratio; 
with an average R&D-to-sales ratio of 0.06 for many 
firms, this corresponds to a 22.17 percent change in 
the R&D-to-sales ratio. The addition of the variable 
for stock concentration results in a significant in- 
crease in variance explained (adjusted R2 = .19, 
benchmark, and .22, second-stage). Firms in the 
computer, electronics, and pharmaceutical indus- 
tries invested significantly more in R&D than firms 
in the automotive industry. 
Japanese sample. For the Japanese sample, the 
leverage ratio was not included as an independent 
TABLE 2 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for U.S. and Japanese Firmsa 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Firm size .17*** -.17*** .26*** -.31*** 
2. Market-to-book ratio -.37*** .19*** -.01 -.08* 
3. R&D-to-sales ratio .05 .07 -.20*** -.02 
4. Leverage .08 .05 -.18** .01 
5. Stock concentration .06 .01 .04 -.08 
a The correlation matrix for the U.S. sample is shown on the upper right (in italic), and the matrix for the Japanese sample is on the 
bottom left. 
* 
p < .05 
** p < .01 
** p < .001 
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TABLE 3 
Results of Regression Analyses of R&D/Sales on Industry and Stock Concentrationa' b 
United States Japan Pooled 
Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark 
Variable 1st Stage 2nd Stage OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage OLS 
Intercept 0.67*** -0.08*** -0.01 0.36*** -0.16 0.04*** 0.61*** -0.05 0.02*** 
Firm size -0.04*** 0.01 -0.02*** 
Leverage 0.05 
Market-to-book ratio -0.00 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.04* -0.02 -0.02*** 0.02*** 
Industry 
Chemical -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.11*** 0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Communication 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.02 -0.03 -0.03** 
Computer -0.05 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.06 0.03*** 
Electronics -0.07 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.06** 0.03*** 
Pharmaceutical -0.08 0.15*** 0.15*** -0.13 0.13** 0.07 -0.07** 0.10"** 0.10*** 
Power -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.28 0.11 0.00 -0.07** -0.04*** -0.05*** 
Stock concentrationc 0.13*** 0.42 0.13* 
Japan 0.02* 0.01 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.15 
F 9.62*** 38.02*** 26.46*** 6.79*** 7.18*** 5.51"** 9.26*** 38.07*** 26.80*** 
a United States, n = 1,012; Japan, n = 270; pooled sample, n = 1,282. Automotive industry is the referent category. 
b First stage: stock concentration = f(assets, leverage, market-to-book, industry). Second stage: R&D/sales = f(market-to-book, industry, 
stock concentration). 
c For stock concentration, the n, mean, and median are as follows: United States, 1,429, 0.39, 0.37; Japan, 293, 0.49, 0.47; t = 8.84***; 
Wilcoxon rank test = 6.66***. Difference in stock concentration coefficient, t = 3.20. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
** p < .001 
variable because large investors were often also 
debt holders (e.g., Prowse, 1990). As in the U.S. 
sample, industry effects were significant. Stock 
concentration is not related to the R&D-to-sales ra- 
tio in Japan (the coefficient is statistically insignif- 
icant), supporting Hypothesis lb. The difference 
(change in the adjusted R2) from the benchmark 
OLS regression to the second-stage regression is 
also very small (adjusted R2 = .12, benchmark, and 
.13, second-stage). 
Pooled sample. Hypothesis 2a states that on the 
average, Japanese firms will have a more concen- 
trated ownership structure than their U.S. counter- 
parts, and Hypothesis 2b states that on the average, 
Japanese firms will invest more in R&D than 
their U.S. counterparts. Table 3 shows the means 
(United States = 39.4%, Japan = 48.9%) and me- 
dians (United States = 37.2%, Japan = 47.1%) of 
stock concentration for Japanese and U.S. firms. 
The t-statistic shows that the mean differences are 
significant at the .001 level. The results of a Wil- 
coxon sign rank test of differences in medians are 
also significant at the .001 level. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2a, results show that, on the average, 
Japanese firms have a significantly more concen- 
trated ownership structures than U.S. firms (addi- 
tional tests were conducted; see the Appendix). 
To test Hypothesis 2b, we also estimated a 2SLS 
regression for the pooled sample of U.S. and Japa- 
nese firms. The coefficient of the Japan country 
dummy (0.02) is positive and significant. Consis- 
tent with Hypothesis 2b, this result suggests that, 
ceteris paribus, Japanese firms invest significantly 
more in R&D than their U.S. counterparts. The re- 
sults show that stock concentration is not related to 
the R&D-to-sales ratio in Japan. We tentatively con- 
clude that the steward role of managers leads to 
incentive congruence, which in turn accounts for 
the higher level of R&D investments in Japan when 
Japanese firms are compared with firms of similar 
size and industry conditions in the United States. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study provided an analysis of the differing 
relationships between ownership structure, R&D 
investments, and goal alignment in the United 
States and Japan. In doing so, it began with the 
premise that U.S. and Japanese firms have different 
owner-management relationships and that these 
differences may result in disparities in R&D invest- 
ments. One explanation for these differences is the 
dissimilarities in culture between the two nations. 
Specifically, the Japanese culture creates condi- 
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tions that favor stewardlike relations (between 
managers and owners). As a result, the influence of 
ownership concentration on the R&D-to-sales ratio 
varies in the two countries. Empirical results show 
several principal findings. 
First, the evidence indicates that stock concen- 
tration is related to the level of R&D investments in 
the United States. Specifically, stock concentration 
is positively related to the R&D-to-sales ratio in 
U.S. firms. Although some scholars have expressed 
concern that th6 concentration of investable funds 
in the hands of money managers who have short- 
term orientations may result in "managerial myo- 
pia" (Blinder, 1992; Dobrzynski, 1986; Jacobs, 
1991; Monks, 1988; Porter, 1992; Thurow, 1993), 
these results suggest the opposite. 
This pattern of results concerning stock concen- 
tration is not inconsistent with the assertion that 
agency theory reflects U.S. firms adequately, while 
stewardship theory represents Japanese firms ade- 
quately. In the United States, increasing concentra- 
tion balances the power of owners vis-a-vis self- 
interested managers in leading to increased R&D 
investments, but in Japan, increasing concentration 
does not affect the level of R&D investments. In 
each country, then, management conditions and 
the impact of governance are nested in cultural and 
institutional processes that create important recip- 
rocal relationships and path dependencies. 
The results have important implications for 
agency theory and its applicability in different na- 
tional settings. The relationships between the man- 
agers and shareholders of Japanese firms are differ- 
ent from those found in the United States. The 
investors of Japanese firms often play multiple 
roles, including monitoring managers, providing 
capital (both debt and equity), providing and ob- 
taining information, and acting as suppliers. These 
interdependencies suggest that Japanese firms may 
have different types of agency problems or may 
resolve agency problems differently (e.g., Lee, 
1997). 
Within the context of this study, we could not 
determine whether the differences in the influence 
of concentrated holdings across these two countries 
is a consequence of the absence of a market for 
corporate control, the presence of steward relation- 
ships, or both. We suspect that the two concepts are 
intertwined with one another and with other inde- 
pendent institutional and cultural factors. Other 
institutional practices may help join manager and 
owner incentives in Japan. Historically, for exam- 
ple, Japanese managers have faced less employ- 
ment risk than their American counterparts. Em- 
ployment risk is a frequently mentioned source of 
owner and manager conflict in American busi- 
nesses (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
Policy Implications 
Recognition of the increasing importance of R&D 
has fueled a debate as to whether U.S. firms under- 
invest relative to their Japanese competitors (Ja- 
cobs, 1991; Miller, 1994; Porter, 1992; Prahalad, 
1994). Critics have argued that profit consciousness 
among shareholders has led to an overemphasis on 
short-term profits. Consequently, managers may 
sacrifice long-term investments, like R&D, in order 
to boost short-term profits (Porter, 1992). This con- 
cern has grown with the increase in institutional 
ownership and, concomitantly, the more than six- 
fold increase in the rate of turnover on the New 
York Stock Exchange since 1987 (Froot et al., 1992). 
"Greater trading volume is, by definition, equiva- 
lent to a reduction in the holding period of the 
average stockholder" (Froot et al., 1992: 42), and 
shorter time horizons for investors translate into 
shorter time horizons for managers, especially with 
regard to evaluating investment opportunities. 
Contrary to opinions expressed in the popular 
press, it is not clear that the U.S. market for corpo- 
rate control invariably causes managers to be "my- 
opic" (Cannella & Monroe, 1997; Porter, 1992). In 
fact, the evidence suggests that the presence of 
large investors may counter tendencies toward re- 
duced R&D. These results are consistent with Koch- 
har and David's (1996) study, which suggested that 
the presence of institutional investors was posi- 
tively related to innovations. 
Future Research 
This study suggests at least three opportunities 
for future research. One avenue of research would 
be to focus on alternative measures and triggers of 
innovation, perhaps by looking at stock price re- 
sponses to product announcements. The owner- 
ship structure of firms is only one factor that may 
influence R&D investments. For example, a compa- 
ny's level of technological diversification (Stewart 
& Chacar, 1998) and the presence of star scientists 
(Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998) also contribute to 
R&D. Another approach might be to further exam- 
ine the relationship between cross-national differ- 
ences in ownership structure, managerial stock- 
holdings, and other corporate actions that are 
influenced by the presence or absence of agency 
conflict, such as corporate diversification and man- 
agerial entrenchment. 
The outcomes for our study hint at the complex- 
ity of governance issues and suggest a third, inte- 
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grative stream of research. Contexts vary, and gover- 
nance variables vary in their impact. Here, the 
different contexts were defined by two nation states. 
Within both of the countries studied here, though, 
owner-manager relationships can vary greatly. 
Agency conflicts exist in Japan, and stewards exist in 
the United States. Excessive reliance on one form of 
control is likely to be a mistake in either country. 
Similarly, single governance variables can have both 
positive and negative impacts. This observation is 
consistent with Finkelstein and D'Aveni's (1994) 
finding that separating the role of board chair and 
CEO can increase board vigilance while decreasing 
CEO effectiveness. Our findings support calls for re- 
search comparing the use of multiple measures of 
corporate governance (e.g., Boyd, 1994). 
Finally, our results imply that agency assump- 
tions about managerial opportunism may be a func- 
tion of context, rather than a reflection of the nat- 
ural tendencies of management. Managers-fearing 
a market for corporate control in which owners 
have little information and low incentive to obtain 
it-will invest in R&D at low levels. When owners 
have knowledge (as reflected by high ownership 
concentration in the United States) or managers 
have a sense of security (in Japan), managers will 
invest in R&D at higher levels. The observed invest- 
ment patterns are in keeping with the image of a 
rational manager responding to complex incentives 
and signals in the financial marketplace. Managers, 
then, are neither naturally opportunists nor stew- 
ards. In effect, managerial behavior is nested in a 
system of intertwined forces, some reinforcing and 
some countervailing each other. 
These issues are particularly pertinent now, 
when corporate governance structures are under 
review and changing. U.S. firms have witnessed the 
increased involvement of institutional investors in 
their governance (Graves, 1988; Wahal, 1996). In 
fact, one author, writing in the Economist, pre- 
dicted this: "Today, we see different national mod- 
els of corporate governance. ... Tomorrow, we can 
expect fewer national differences" Kay, 1993: 69). 
These transitions are especially interesting to study 
because they allow for a comparison of the differing 
corporate ownership structures. Further, since the 
convergence of national models of governance does 
not come with a guarantee of convergence in em- 
ployment practices and other related triggers of 
management behavior, such studies will shed light 
on issues of material consequence. 
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APPENDIX 
We used additional tests to understand whether the 
stock concentration coefficient in the U.S. sample was 
statistically different from the stock concentration coef- 
ficient in the Japanese sample. Following a procedure 
described in Hardy (1993), we calculated a pooled esti- 
mate of the population variance, combining the two sam- 
ples, and we weighted each subgroup estimate by the 
appropriate degrees of freedom. With equality of group 
variance assumed, the formula for the pooled estimate of 
the population variance is: 
2 (n1 - kl - 1)s21 + (2 - k2 - 1)S22 
Spooled = N- (k1 + 
k2+ 
2) 
where nI and n2 are the numbers of cases in the samples, 
N is the number of cases in the pooled sample, k, and k2 
are the numbers of independent variables included in the 
sample regressions, and s,21 and s22 are the mean residual 
sums of squares from their respective sample regressions. 
The t-test for the difference in coefficients from the sep- 
arate subsample regressions is: 
B, - B2 




where s~ and s,2 are the variances of the estimates of B, 
and B2. The above t-test reproduces the t-test for the stock 
concentration coefficient in the pooled sample regression 
model. For the 2SLS regression, the t-statistic is 3.20; 
thus, the stock concentration coefficient in the U.S. sam- 
ple is statistically different from the stock concentration 
coefficient in the Japanese sample. 
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